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Underdissipation of a contested rent in an imperfectly discriminating contest
might be due to risk-aversion, a small number of contestants or public good char-
acteristics of the rent. This paper shows how underdissipation is associated with
imperfect government credibiGty. In particular we study the relationship between
the extent ofrent dissipation and the duration of the contest and government cred-
ibility. When the rent is preassigned to potential beneficiaries total rent dissipation
is demonstrated to be less than 30010. We also obtain the combinations of contest
duration and government credibility yielding the maximaf rent-seeking outlays.1
1 Introduction
This paper is concerned with the effect of incomplete government credibility and of the
duration of the government ruling period on the outlays made in imperfectly discriminat-
ing rent-seeking contests, Hillman (1986). In our extended dynamic rent-seeking game
the potential beneficiaries of a privately appropriable transfer attempt to influence the
political allocation mechanism. This happens when the transfer is contestable, and also
when the transfer is preassigned but uncertain (the government commitment credibility
to award the rent during its ruling period is imperfect). In this latter situation an indi-
vidual does not compete against other potential beneficiaries, but against nature trying
to secure his receiving of the preassigned transfer while the government is still in ofíice.
In imperfectly discriminating contests rent dissipation is complete when the competi-
tors are indentical risk-neutral individuals, the number of contestants is sufíiciently large
and the transfer is a private good transfer, Tullock (1980). Subsequent studies have
shown that the contested rent is underdissipated when the contenders are risk averse,
Hillman and Katz (1984), the individuals' valuations of the prize are not identical, Hill-
man and Riley (1989), the contested rent has public good characteristics, Katz et al.
(1990), Ursprung (1990), or when groups of individuals compete on a private good rent,
Nitzan (1991). In the current study we introduce another possible source of underdissi-
pation, viz. imperfect government credibility.
Our extended rent-seeking game is presented in the following section. Section 3 which
contains the results of the equilibrium analysis is divided into four subsections. In the first
one we provide the conditions ensuring that the political contest is effective, namely, that
the players expand resources in trying to win the rent. In the second subsection we show
that the rent is underdissipated. The third part contains the compartive statics results.
In the fourth subsection we study the case of preassigned or earmarked rents where the
competition element is neutralized. The extent of rent dissipation in this special case is
compared to that of the general case. We also derive a limit to underdissipation when
the rents are preassigned. The conclusions of our study are presented in the final section.2
2 The F~amework
Consider n risk neutral identica] individuals confronting the opportunity of winning
a prespecified continuous transfer S. This transfer, which is allocated by the rufing
government, is referred to as a contestable rent. The government stays in office for a
fixed period T. In our imperfectly discriminating contest the political process cannot
discriminate among the competing individuals to designate a winner at a certain time
with certainty, but rather the outcomeof the contest is the assignment to each individual
of a probability that he wins the contest at time t, t E(O,T]. An individual winning the
contest at time t secures the continuous transfer S from the winning time until the end
of the government ruling period, i.e., his total gain will be equal to S(T - t].
The probability that an individual is the successíul contender at time t depends on
his and the other competitors' continuous rent-seeking outlays x„j - 1, ... , n and on
the parameter b, 6~ 0, representing the credibility of the government or, alternatively,
the determination of the government to respect its commitment and actually make the
promised transfer. Each player in our game competes against the other contenders as
well as against time. He may lose the game and irretrievably lose the outlays which he
made in the attempt to influence the outcome of the contest in his favor either because
some other contender wins the contest or because time is run out and nobody wins the
contest.
The individual enforceable outlays commitment is made at t- 0. This implies that his
total rent-seeking outlays are in fact equal to Tx;, regardless of whether he or any other
contender wins the contest at some time t, t c T. Note that in our model the individual's
rent is uncertain ranging between 0 and ST and that it is possible that nobody wins
the contest. The probability that individual i wins the contest in the immediate next
instant, given that no one won the contest yet, is assumed to be proportional to x; and
b. Formally, let t; denote the time individual i wins the contest. Then
prob {t; E[i,t f dt] : t~ ) t;, j~ i }- óx;dt, i, j- 1, ..., n.
It can be shown that given the above conditional probability, the density function of
success by individual i to win the contest at time t is e-óXtbx; and the density function3
of failure by individual i to win the contest at time t is e-óx`óX-;, where X-~; ~ x;
and X-; -~~~; x~. Given the individual outlay commitments (x~, ... , x„), the expected
time of winning the contest is given by
E(t) - I~ t e-ax`DXdt -
óX ~~
Note that b can be interpreted as a measure for the discredibility of the government or
of the degree of diíficulty of winning the contest.
Given the individual endowed wealth yT and the n individuals' rent-seeking outlays
(r~, ..., x„), the expected payoff of individual i during the government ruling period
[O, T) is given by R,~
R- fT S(T - t)e-ax`óx;dt ~(y - x;)T - X IT S(T - t)e-ax`ëXdt f(y - x;)T
- XSB(X)f(y-x;)T (1)
where B(X) - [T - áx(1 - e-axT))
(1 - e-axT) is the probability that the contest is won by some individual before T.3
sx ~s the expected winning time. The expected time of winning the contest conditional
on the termination of the contest before T is thereíore equal to óx ( 1 - e-axT ). In turn,
B(X ) is the corresponding conditional expected duration of the period during which the
transfer S is received and SB(X ) is the expected total rent (transfer) conditional on
there being a winner in the contest.
Interestingly, Tullock's (1980) rent-seeking contest is obtained as a special case of our
model when there is no uncertainty regarding the government's ability to stand behind
its commitment. Specifically, when ó-. oo the total transfer is equal to ST and
R- ~;ST-~(y-x;)T (~)
which is precisely the payoff function of agent i in Tullock's game. In such a case our
dynamic contest reduces of course to a static one.
In the rent-seeking literature the individual is assumed to compete against other
agents and therefore the number of contenders n is at least 2. In our extended model4
the contest is viable even when n- 1. Furthermore, this latter extreme case is not so
peculiar since in many political-economic environments the government transfer pattern
is strictly constrained. Often, politicians do not have discretion regarding the manner in
which they can allocate their available budgets. In particular, under earmarking of the
available budgets multi-agent contests are not likely to arise. Still, the candidate recipient
of the budget may need to LLcompeter and spend resources in order to secure his winning
of the rent, i.e., receive the designated budget while the government is still in office. The
special case of a single-member contest thus merits attention and is separately analyzed
in the following section. We are also concerned with the comparison of the outcome of
an n-member contest on budget of size S with the outcome of n single-member contests
on the same total budget where in each single-member contest the individual can win a
rent equal to ~.
3 Results
A. Effective Contests
In a pure strategy Nash equilibrium of our rent-seeking game, (x~,...,xn), each in-
dividual i solves the problem:
max R(xl,...,x,,; á,S,T) - R (i;,x-;;ó,S,T) ~,
s.tOGx;Cyandx-;-x';.
(3)
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium ai - x~ -... - xn - x'. In such equilibrium the
players may prefer to be passive and avoid spending any resources. That is, it is possible
that the contest is ineffective, i.e., x' - 0. In the following proposition we establish that
this possibility is ruled out when the government is in office a sufficiently long period
T, when its credibility ó is sufficiently high or when the contestable rent S is large enough.
Proposition 1: x' ~ 0 if T 1 as.5
Proof: By the second order condition for x' to be a solution of (3), eá G 0. To prove
the proposition, we will show that T 1 ós implies that limr~o 8 1 0.
aR sx-; B(x) sx; aB(x) -
áx; - x x} x ax T
where
B(X) - T e-axT 1




aB(X) - 1 Te-axr e-axT (6)
aX ëXz - X - óxz '
In a symmetric Nash equilibrium then,
aR aR (n -1) sB(x) s aB
áx,
~r~-...csn-s-
ax - n X } n ax - T.
By I'Hospital rule,
B(X ) TXë ~ e-6XT - 1 Të - ëTe-axr
lim - lim - lim
x-o X x-o 6Xz x,o 2óX
bzTze-axT óTz
- zló 26 - 2 ~
8B 1 - bXTe-axr - e-axr
zó aX - zó 6X z
-ÀTe-axT .~ ózTzXe-axT ~ óTe-axT óTz










An interior equilibrium, (x', ..., x'), 0 G x' G y, is characterized by the following
equation:
aR (n -1) sB(x') s aB(x') ( )
ax - n X' } n aX - T- 0. 116
The total rent-seeking outlays in such an equilibrium is equal to X' - nx'. In our
dynamic setting the uncertainty regarding the commitment of the government entails
underdissipation of the contested rent. That is,
Proposition 2: X' G S.
Proof: We show below that at X- S, e G 0. By the second order condition, a~R G 0
which implies that X' G S.
For X - S,
8R n- 1 1 e-asT I 1 -ásT
e-bST
8x - n (T - 6S ~ 6S } n bS -
Te - 6S - T. (12)
By proposition 1, X' 7 0 implies that T~ ós ~ ss. Note that 0 G e-asT G 1 and
therefore, ~ G as. Hence,
8R n- 1 1 n- 1 ( 1 1 l Te-asT e-asT
8x G n T} nT -T } n `6S - bSI - n - n6S G
0. (13)
O
Incomplete credibility of the government generates incomplete rent dissipation. It is
also detrimenta! to the individual welfare; The fact that e-asz G 1 imply that the indi-
vidual utility is reduced relative to the case of complete government credibility (compare
(I) and (2)).
C. Comparative Statics
In the following proposition we obtain the intuitive result that total rent-seeking
outlays are positively related to the size of the contestable rent and to the credibility
of the government. ;~4ore surprisingly, the contest duration effect is also unambiguous;
for n 1 2 the extent of rent dissipation is positively related to the duration of the contest.
Proposition S :






Substituting the equilibrium condition (11) into ( 14) we obtain:
8X' -T
8S - Sá~R ~ 0.
(~~) a~.
(15)
n 1 e-eX~T Te'eX~T 1 S 1 T-óX'T e-ex'T Te-"x'T 1
-{„S [- á~x'~ - ax. t áix.i ]-~ n[- á~X.~ -}- T e f~X.z f áx' ~ 1
a?R
ar~
( ~ l S 1 e' ~ex-T - e'ex'r 9 T c-ex'r l
- ` n J ó~ - óX' á~X'2 }`S n J
8?R
8r~
- J~ S 8B(X') ST~e-ex'T l
i n ó 8X } n f
8?R '
8rl
Denoting áX by G(T), one can readily verify (see (6)) that G(0) - 0 and áz -
áTe-áxT ~ 0. Hence, for T~ 0, G(T)- áX ~ 0 which implies that, for n~ 2, aaó~ ~ 0.
(iii)8X'
- {n;,~S ~X. - `-X. T~ i. nóTe'ax'T - ll (16)
óT a'-R 1
- 8r~
Substituting the equilibrium condition (11) into (16) we obtain:
Ó.X' - nn T T a~~ ~ nói~e'óX'T
aT - a'-R ' (17)
- 8r~
For n 1 2 and given that eX 7 0, aaT~ ~ 0. O
A longer contest implies both an increased prize and higher chances that the contest
is won. The increased expected reward stimulates higher rent-seeking outlays. However,
the increased likelihood of success has two contrasting effects on X'. On the one hand,
the "competition~ effect (see the first term in the nominator of (16)) induces the players
to intensify their efforts in attempting to win the contest. On the other hand, when the
competition effect is disregarded, a longer contest implies that time is working harder for
the individual player and for a sufficiently large T, despite the income effect, an increase
in T may reduce the individual incentives to spend resources (see the second term in8
the nominator of (16)). Under a viable competition, n~ 2, the former positive effect
is dominant ensuring the unambiguous relationship between the duration of the contest
and the extent of rent dissipation.
D. Preassigned Rents: The Single Player Case
Let n- 1. In this case of minimal competition the politicians do not have discretion
regarding the manner in which they can allocate their budget. R.ather the budget is
earmarked. The contest, which can now be interpreted as a game against nature, is still
viable since the potential recipient of the budget can affect his chance oí receiving the
rent. To compare the extent of rent dissipation under the multi-member rent-seeking
contest, n 1 2, and the single-member competition against time, suppose that in the
latter case each individual is allocated a budget which is equal to s- n. An optimal
rent-seeking outlay xo is now characterized by the following condition:
8R 1 Te-a:oT e-a:oT
8x - S baó - xo - bxó - T- 0. (18)
It turns out that the total rent-seeking outlays in an n-member contest, n~ 2, are larger
than the resources expanded by n individuals who separately compete just against the
running time in attempting to receive their equal share n in the total budget distributed.
Proposition 4: xo C x'.
Proof: Let Z(n,x) -(n- 1)X ~ áx~
The multi-player equilibrium condition (11) can therefore be rewritten as:
aR ~„~z- n Z(n, x) - T- 0
and the single-player equilibrium condition (18) can be written as:
~R ~„-,- nZ(l,x)-T -0.
(19)
(20)
By Lemma 4.1 which is proven below, Z(n, x) is increasing in n. Hence, for n 1
2, Z(n,x) ~ Z(l,x). This implies that for x- xo, eR ~„~z1 0. By the second or-9
der condition, e~ ~„~~G 0, which means that xa c x'.
aZ(n, x)
Lemma 4.1: an ~ 0'
Proof: aZ(n,x) B(X) (n - 1) ~eXX - B(X)~ x a'B
an - X } X~ } aX~x
B(x) n- I aB B(x) x a~B
- x} n áx- x~} náx~
- 1 rB(X) a~Bl n- 1 aB
n I` X }`YaX~J } n aX-
We proved earlier that áX ~ 0. We therefore complete the proofof the lemma by showing
that ~X ~ X áX,~ 1 0.
Y 6XT
X} XaX~ - X T- óX
f 3 ó~{ t 2Te-6xT~ óXTxe-sxTl - ~A(T).
Note that A(0) - 0 and áT - 1- e-Y - y~e-Y - D(y) where y- ÁXT. Note that
D(0) - 0 and eo -(1 - y)~e-v ~ 0( eo - 0 for y- 1). Hence, aT ~ 0 and A(T) 1 0
forT~O. o
The analysis of the effect of a change in the duration of the contest on the rent-seeking
outlays dces not yield an unambiguous result as in Proposition 3(iii). This is due to the
fact that the positive "competition effect" vanishes (see the first term in the nominator
of (16)). In the single-member contest, aT - 'áT`-``or-'. By substituting (18) into ~ -~
we obtain that aT - ~ where k- óxoT and H(k) --1 f k2e-k ~ e-k f ke-k.
e`~'~
The function H(k) satisfies the following properties:
(i) H(0) - 0.
(ii) limk~~ H(k) - -1.
(iii) H'(k) - k(1 - k)e-k and therefore H'(k)~0 if k~l.
Hence, there exists ko ~ 1 such that H(k) 1 0 for 0 ~ k G ko and H(k) G 0 for k 1 kd.
Since xo is a function of T, one needs to check that k- óxoT is not greater or smaller
than ko for any T~ 0. It is clear from the sequel that these two possibilities do not occur.lo
That is, for any given á there exists T' such that óioT' - kd, óaoT G !co for T G T' and
óroT ~ ko for T] T'. In turn, for T G T', eT 1 0 and for T~ T', aT G 0. Clearly,
this T' maximizes the individual rent-seeking outlays. Our next natural question is what
is the maximal degree of rent dissipation corresponding to T'.
Clearly, this maximal level constitutes a limit to the extent of rent dissipation in
the constrained environment where rent recipients compete against time but not against
other recipients. The following proposition provides the answer to the ahove question.
Proposition 5: Civen ó and S, MaxT ~' ~"'6 -"s -~~~ - 0.298.
Proof: The government ruling period [O, T'] maximizing the extent of rent dissipation
given s and ó satisfies the following first order condition:
8xo sóTe-ósoT - 1
8T - alR - 0 - á~7
or, equivalently,







To solve for c, let us substitute (23) into (18), the condition characterizing the optimal
rent-seeking outlay ao, to obtain
I I -Inc I -Inc I
In2c - !n ce - ln~ce - c~
(24)11
Let y- ln c and so, c- ev. (24) can then be rewritten as follows:
ey-y~fyfl. (25)
The solution of (25) is given by y- 1.791. By (23), ~~~ -~68 -0.298. ~
A government interested in the maximization of rent-seeking outlays has an optimal
contest duration which is given by T' - i6 -~a -~. Alternatively, when T is a given
parameter, such a government has an optimal credibility level which is equal to á' - T.
This implies that the more credible the government, the shorter its preferred ruling time.
And the longer the ruling period, the lower its preferred level of credibility. In any event,
by Proposition 5, the maximal extent of rent dissipation is invariant to the level of the
parameters and to whether the government controls T or á.
4 Conclusions
In our simple model of rent seeking under uncertainty the identical risk-neutral potential
beneficiaries of the rent recognize that the government is not perfectly credible and thus
may not stand behind its commitment and actually transfer the promised rent. If gov-
ernment credibility Á is sufficiently low, the period it is ruling [O, T] is sufficiently short
or the rent S is sufficiently small, the potential beneficiaries have no incentive to expand
resources in attempting to win the rent (Proposition 1). In an interior symmetric Nash
equilibrium the rent is underdissipated (Proposition 2). The extent of rent dissipation
is positively related to the size of the rent. If the number of contenders is at least two,
it is also positively related to the contest duration and to the government credibility
level (Proposition 3). When the rents or income transfers are preassigned to designated
beneficiaries, competiton among players is neutralized. That is, each potential benefi-
ciary is the single player in a game against nature. The extent of rent dissipation in
an n-member contest on S, n~ 2, is larger than the extent of rent dissipation in an12
environment where n individuals independently compete just against nature in attempt-
ing to win their designated rent which is equal to r(Proposition 4). In this latter case
the extent of rent dissipation is no longer always positively related to the government
ruling period or to its credibility. It turns out that there exists a ruling period T' which
maximizes the extent of rent dissipation. The maximal rent dissipation is equal to 0.298
and it is invariant to the parameters of the game (Proposition 5).13
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Footnotes
1. Notice that
a(e-ax~óx;) - e-ax~x;(1 - bXf)~0 a t~1- E(t). aó ~ ~ ax
2. For simplicity we assume that the discount factor is equal to zero. This assumption
has no effect on the insight of our results.
3. Let F(t, x;) denote the cumulative distribution of success by individual i to win
the contest by time t given that his rent-seeking outlay is x;. Then, his conditional




By integration we obtain:
Hence,
-!n(1 - F) - bx;t.
1 - F - e-a~,e
The probability that by t no one wins the contest is given by II; 1(1 - F(t,x;)) -
e-a~r,a - e-ax~ ,n,hich means that the probability that the contest is won by some
individual before T is equal to (1 - e-axT)Discussion Paper Serles, CentER, Tilburg Universlty, 7be Netberlands:
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